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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY 
CENTER FOR 
CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 
EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS 
Excerpts From An Interview With Rob Willem Treep 
David R. Larson 
Rob Willem Treep was born in Rotterdam, Netherlands, in 1949. He 
received his early education in Rotterdam, and graduated from the 
University of Utrechtwith a Bachelor's degree in 1970. Atthe University 
of Amsterdam he studied ethics, sociology and Old Testament, and was 
awarded his doctoral degree in 1975. He pursued advanced studies in 
Theory and Practice of Adult Education at the same university, and was 
admitted to the ministry of the Dutch Reformed Church in 1984. 
He has worked as a staff member and director of the Residential Adult 
Education Center 't Dackhues' in Huissen, Netherlands, and taught 
ethics and theology to ministers, physicians, nurses and church volunteer 
workers. He has been a staff member of the Theological Department at 
'Hogeschool Holland' (School for Higher Education) in Amsterdam, 
teachingsocial ethics, bioethics, ethics and pastoral care, and ecclesiology. 
He has served as a member of the Ethics Department of the Medical 
Faculty, University of Nijmegen. 
He is a member of the National Board of 'Kerk en Vrede, ' a peace 
organization, and a member of TWO, a board established forthejudging 
of medical experiments. 
Treep and his wife have two children, a boy of 17 and a girl, 14. 
Dr. Treep, we hear that euthanasia is practiced in the 
Netherlands? What is happening there? 
Taboos on the subject have almost disappeared. People are 
openly talking about death and dying, describing death as the 
last stage of their lives, the last possibility for self-development. 
People want to take death and dying into their own hands, to die 
as quickly as possible, without pain and suffering. They want, 
in a beautiful way, to say goodbye to friends and family. Self-
determination in both life and death is important in the Nether-
lands. 
When did all this start? 
The euthanasia discussion started in 1973 when a physician 
killed her mother upon her request. The case went to court, but 
the physician was not indicted. Since then there have been 
many trials over euthanasia and a great deal of discussion. A 
consensus has evolved that euthanasia is only assisting in dying 
after a patient seriously requests it. A protocol has been devel-
oped which requires that the patient be terminally ill, that the 
request be serious, continuous and free, and that the physician 
consult other physicians and keep records. 
I understand that the word "euthanasia" is used very 
precisely in the Netherlands. What exactly does it mean to 
most people? 
Polls reveal that nine out of ten favor euthanasia because th.ey 
don't want to endure pain and suffering while lying in intensive-
care beds connected to high-tech machines. But it's misleading 
to interview people in the streets, as some television programs 
have done, and conclude that nine out of ten people favor 
euthanasia. If you ask, "Would you want your doctor to give you 
a lethal injection if you were dying and didn't want to go on 
any longer?" itwould be fifty-fifty. Most Dutch people hold that 
painkilling is of primary importance. To make those last steps of 
life without pain, to be aware of yourself and to be able to say 
goodbye to your loved ones is really important. If there is 
suffering, most would agree that a doctor should be permitted to 
end a patient's life upon his request. ' 
It sounds as if the word "euthanasia" refers to what we 
would call "active voluntary euthanasia" in this country. 
What does this mean for patients who cannot speak for 
themselves? 
There has to be a request; it has to be voluntary. Otherwise it's 
murder-simply killing the patient. There are comatose pa-
tients, elderly people, severely handicapped, and neonates to 
consider also, who cannot speak for themselves. The Dutch 
Association of Physicians has worked out other criteria for end-
ing these lives. But there is strong government opposition 
because these criteria go farther than euthanasia upon request. 
Do you think within a few years, people will be able to 
request euthanasia for loved ones in persistent vegetative 
states or who are unable to speak for themselves? 
We don't have the "surrogate" solution as you have here. Of 
course, the physician is expected to consult the family and 
proxies before making a decision. \Ve had a woman who was 
comatose for almost fifteen years. Her husband tried to convince 
the nursing home to let her die, but they refused. So he went to 
court. The court allowed the nursing home to withhold nutri-
tion, and the woman soon died. In the Netherlands there are 
some nursing homes which will continue caring for the patient, 
while other nursing homes and hospitals have other policies. You 
know in advance what the physicians and nurses are doing in a 
particular home, and you make your decision when you commit 
the patient to a given home. 
So people choose an institution based in part on its policies 
on end -of-life decisions? 
Yes, but never end-of-life decisions in an active way. Normally 
in a nursing home you will not find a doctor practicing active end-
of-life by giving a lethal injection. This is not permitted unless 
the patient requests it. 
About how many patients die each year in the Netherlands 
by euthanasia? 
The Remmelenk Inquiry last fall reported that less than two 
percent of deaths involved euthanasia, or about 2,300 a year. 
This figure includes 400 patients who died from assisted suicide. 
Then the other 1,900 died following intervention by doctors? 
How many die because treatments are withheld or with-
drawn? 
The number of deaths in 1989 was 130,000. The Remmelenk 
Inquiry reports that 49,000 of that number died from an increase 
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of painkilling drugs. Included in the figure, possibly, are those 
who died from withholding of treatment upon their request. 
Colleagues of mine from Nijmegen point out that we don't kno 
(and the Remmelenk Inquiry doesn't know) exactly what to 
think aboutthose49,000 people. There must be a range of medical 
interventions, different goals and different defini tions of actions. 
Because euthanasia is not legalized, physicians who practice it 
are afraid to tell exactly what they have done. Obviously there 
is more involuntary euthanasia among those 49,000 than IS 
spelled out in the report. 
What do you think is the frequency of abuse with this 
approach? Is it your impression that some people who do 
not want to die are being killed? Do you believe apprehension 
is increasing in convalescent homes or that things are 
functioning rather smoothly? 
It's not true that people are killed without request. The first aim 
of all physicians in the Netherlands, with few exceptions, is to 
care for and cure the patient. But a patient can refuse treatment. 
A DNR (do not resuscitate) decision, in consultation with the 
family, relatives, and nurses in the home can be made without 
problems. There is a tendency to reach this agreement more 
easily than twenty or thirty years ago. The decision to end the 
life of the patient is always made with great care. There's no 
hurry to just "let him die" or "pull the plug" without consulta-
tion with family, nurses, or the hospital ethics committee. 
Do you see evidence of a "slippery slope" impact in th ... 
Netherlands? 
No. I think the slippery slope argument is not really an argument 
but a feeling. And there are no signs that the feeling is correct. 
I would say, on the contrary, as long as you clearly define 
euthanasia and its borders you are safe. But if the definition of 
euthanasia is unclear, then the slippery slope is a real danger. 
Openness about euthanasia keeps it far from the slippery slope. 
What do you think about the suggestion that this is leading 
us into something similar to Nazi practices during World 
War II? 
This is a cliche. It does an injustice to the intentions of 
physicians, ethicists, and others who are talking about euthana-
sia. This is a totally different thing. According to Nazi ideology, 
certain races and the mentally handicapped had no right to exist. 
Resistance in the Netherlands to the Nazis was considerable. 
The Dutch are angry about this comparison, because what we 
are trying to do with euthanasia is merciful and caring. We feel 
that certain people who oppose medical progress are dominating 
us, so we try to free the people and give them their right to self-
determination. 
As I understand it, then, euthanasia remains punishabltl 
but is not always punished, particularly if it takes place 
within established guidelines. What are the fundamental 
Continued on page 8 
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Thoughts Provoked by 
Dr. Kevorkian's Suicide Machine 
GuyHunt,MD 
Professor of Neurology 
School of Medicine 
Loma Linda University 
Deciding whether suicide is ethical in medical cases involves 
asking four additional questions: 
1. Is it ethical to assist in a suicide? 
2. What sort of assistance is ethical? 
3. Under what circumstances, what diagnosis, what physi-
cal state, how much pajn and discomfort, after how much and 
what kind of treatment, and after how much and what kind of 
consultation is assisted suicide ethical? 
, 4. From whom should the request come-the patient alone, 
Tlhe patient and his spouse, his family, the family physician, a 
friend, the guardian, a third-party payer, the state, national 
authorities, or "society" (you and me!)? 
All of the above questions have major ramifications and each 
one could entail many hours of discussion. Let me outline for 
you my own position in these areas. First, I believe that suicide 
is usually (always?) a poor solution to most (all?) problems, and 
is probably both immoral and unfortunate since it often is the 
result of irrational thinking, usually in a severely depressed 
person. It follows, then, that I believe that assisting in suicide is 
both morally and ethically wrong, especially for a physician who 
has, at least ostensibly, been trained to preserve life if at all 
possible. Thus I think Dr. Kevorkian's position and actions are 
immoral from a religious point of view, unethical as a physician, 
irresponsible as a pathologist, and insensitive as a human being. 
His machine seems to be simply an attempt to escape the legal 
responsibility. 
At the present time there is no unanimity among physicians, 
ethicists, and others as to whether a person can be "helped to 
die," either by "commission" with drugs, firearms, etc., or by 
"omission" through discontinuing medicine, withholding anti-
biotics, stopping intravenous feeding and fluids, while the pa-
tient is "cerebrally" alive. It is of course a thin line between 
"preventing suffering" and "aiding dying." But physicians have 
)
0 mandate to prolong suffering while prolonging dying. It is 
. ere that the "black" and "white" become opaquely "gray." I 
personally believe that the determining factor in a dying, suffer-
ing patient should be his comfort, not the potential toxicity of the 
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pain reliever. But my choice is for compassion, not euthanasia! 
Ignoring the ethical and moral aspects, a consideration of Dr. 
Kevorkian's apparatus reveals that it has been effective, in at 
least a few cases, and does not increase the patient's physical 
suffering. It is relatively simple, aside from the intravenous 
feature, and has at least one built-in safeguard, in that the 
activating button must be pushed three times. I think that 
perhaps more "times" and/or an obligatory pause between each 
activation would be desirable, allowing the patient time to 
reconsider his decision. I have no doubt that some would change 
their minds. This is illustrated by the fact that no one ever 
commits suicide by holding his breath! 
Several very questionable, probably unacceptable, factors 
can be noted in the case of Janet Adkins: 
1. Mrs. Adkins was seen by Dr. Kevorkian only once prior 
to the event. 
2. No information was sought except from the patient and 
her husband. 
3. She was apparently never actually "examined" by Dr. 
Kevorkian. 
4. No second opinion was obtained. 
5. Her physician's advice was ignored (Dr. Murray Raskin 
implored him not go through with the plan.) 
6. No legal clearance was requested. 
7. No attempt was made to confirm the diagnosis. 
8. No other diagnoses were apparently considered. 
9. Dr. Kevorkian is nei ther a family physician nor an internist. 
He is neither a neurologist nor a psychiatrist; he is a pathologist 
who does not "treat" patients. 
The diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease in l'v1rs. Adkins raises 
several questions and problems: 
1. She was younger (54 years old) than most seriously 
afflicted Alzheimer's patients (although old enough for what was 
formerly called "presenile dementia"). 
2. She is said to have played tennis with her son the week 
before and defeated him. She was obviously not "terminally ill!" 
3. Suicide is rare in Alzheimer's patients. 
4. Depression is a common cause of suicide and it may 
mimic dementia, as may hypothyroidism, toxic conditions, and 
excessive sedation. 
Although I believe there may be situations where it might be 
moral, ethical, and humane to assist a patient to die, I am certain 
that in such cases there must be specific criteria to be met, much 
consultation with family, friends and physicians, much personal 
introspection, and much prayer. Dr. Kevorkian's solution is not 
the answer. . 
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Because Laws Against Euthanasia 
Send a Broader Signal, 
Experiments Must be Careful 
James W. Walters, PhD 
Professor of Christian Ethics 
Faculty of Religion 
Loma Linda University 
Janet Adkins was an educated and cultured woman living in 
a posh suburb of Portland. After being diagnosed as having 
Alzheimer's disease, she convinced Dr. Jack Kevorkian to assist 
her in committing suicide. She and Dr. Kevorkian were "suc-
cessful" but were ~heir actions ethical? The answer is "yes" if 
you agree with Dr. Kevorkian that the "cardinal rule in ethics" 
is patient autonomy. The answer may be "no" if community 
well-being is the determining principle. 
Americans have a strong commitment to individual au-
tonomy, but more is at stake than just individual rights. By 
legally banning assisted suicide, society is signalling its high 
valuation of personal life. State laws against assisted suicide 
affirm the value society places on its sentient persons-be they 
depressed individuals or those with limited life available. These 
laws provide social coherence, especially as society becomes 
more pluralistic and secular. Any society-indeed civilization 
itself-exists on the basis of shared views on basic subjects. An 
essential function of shared beliefs is the formation and main-
tenance of a stable, orderly society. Clifford Geertz, in a Yale 
lecture, spoke of man's laws as "webs of signification he himself 
has spun." He argues that the primary question is whether 
modern people "through law, anthropology, or anything else, 
(can) image principled lives they can practicably lead." 
\Vhat cohesiveness modern America possesses increasingly 
comes through state and national laws. In the 1960s laws against 
segregation helped bring equality to the races; in the 1970s all 
women gained the right to legal abortions; in the 1980s regula-
tions were made and laws interpreted which further widened the 
gap between the haves and the have-nots. 
The 1990s could well be shaping up as the decade of assisted 
suicide and active euthanasia in America. Present euthanasia 
laws have been proposed in several states. But would legaliza-
tion of euthanasia make us a better society? It surely would allow 
more freedom to perhaps thousands of citizens who desire an 
earlier than natural exit from a debilitating life. But what effect 
would such legislation have on the other 250 million Americans 
whose views on day-to-day life and its value are formed in 
manifold ways? 
Of special importance, what would cases like Adkins'-if 
sanctioned-say to the handicapped about themselves? To the 
teenager who is temporarily depressed and sees a bleak future? 
To the drug user who is contemplating his suicidal lifestyle? 
1\:1 any who are on the fringes of mainstream society don't read the 
fine print in state laws. Approval of active euthanasia could be 
heard in the street as yet another murmur that human life isn't 
highly valued. On the other hand, does society show its high 
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valuation of person by continuing to disallow an early exit from 
a life of truly constant and unbearable pain? 
If each case of assisted suicide would follow the idealize 
pattern of a gruesome, terminal illness brought to a merciful end 
in a long sleep, the impact on society's life-valuing could well be 
beneficial. 
Perhaps Mrs. Adkins is the wrong person for focusing the 
important debate on active euthanasia. Some individuals are 
truly in unrelieved pain from a terminal illness. Regulations 
could be carefully hedged and nuanced-e.g., confirmation of 
terminal illness by two independent physicians-to exclude 
those like Jane Adkins. There may be a balance between 
exclusively running with either individual autonomy orcommu-
nal well-being. But that compromise must be forged in a national 
debate to which Mrs. Adkins and her doctor have contributed 
but in no way resolved. 
In the meantime, Americans can benefit from the ongoing 
experiment in the Netherlands, a socially progressive, homo-
geneous nation, which is pioneering with a policy of assisted 
suicide. Taking the example of movements in Washington and 
California, other states may accept the challenge of creating 
finely nuanced legislations that would allow legitimate euthana-
sia. Thus, these states could serve as controlled experiments to 
indicate whether or not appropriate legislation can be created to 
properly manage active euthanasia. Whatever the future may 
hold for active euthanasia, one thing is certain, it should not 
contain the picture of American doctors outfitting their vans for 
euthanasia experiments .• 
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Act of Murder or Active Compassion? 
Andrea K. Scott, JD 
Cooper, Brown, Kardaras & Scharf 
Pasadena, California 
During 1991, two highly publicized suicides brought into 
public focus the question of whether or not our society is 
prepared to legalize the form of euthanasia known as physician 
assisted suicide. In July, 1991, a grand jury refused to indict Dr. 
Timothy E. Quill for his assistance to his patient "Diane" in 
committing suicide. 1 Diane, who suffered from leukemia, re-
fused an aggressive and debilitating course of therapy which had 
very limited potential to stay her terminal illness. Over the 
course of time, Dr. Quill worked through every possible alterna-
tive with Diane. He, eventually supplied Diane with a prescrip-
tion for sleeping pills, with knowledge of her intent to end her 
life in a dignified manner consistent with her philosophy oflife. 2 
On December 13, 1990, a Michigan criminal court dismissed 
first-degree murder charges brought against Dr. Jack Kevorkian, 
who assisted Janet Adkins in taking her own life by injecting a 
series of lethal drugs. Adkins was suffering from what autopsy 
results indicated was advanced Alzheimer's disease.3 On Oc-
tober 23, 1991, Dr. Kevorkian assisted two other women suffering 
from chronic, intractable pain in taking their lives. As a retired 
pathologist, Dr. Kevorkian was not the treating physician, friend, 
nor even an acquaintance of Janet Adkins or any of the women 
'e subsequently assisted in committing suicide. He did not 
-'I.ndependently confirm the patients' diagnoses or necessarily 
explain alternative medical options to them. Rather, he devised 
modalities of death and made them readily accessible to persons 
he did not know professionally or personally, but whom he 
adjudged (in short order) to be competent to choose to use them. 
In all three cases, the criminal charges against Dr. Kevorkian 
were dismissed because NIichigan has no law making physician 
assisted suicide a crime.4 
As the French anthropologist Emile Durkheim observed 
nearly a century ago, "[t]he private experiences usually thought 
to be the proximate causes of suicide have only the influence 
borrowed from the victim's moral predisposition, itself an echo 
of the moral state of society."S t\,1oreover, the action of Dr. 
Kevorkian must be viewed within the context of American 
society as a whole. Even as one condemns Kevorkian both for 
violating certain ethical canons of modern medical practice and 
for doing so in a sensationalist manner, one must acknowledge 
the ground swell of support by peoples of diverse racial, ethnic 
and socio-economic backgrounds who stand unified in their 
support oflegalizing active physician assisted suicide. Momen-
tum forthis movement builds not from the participants' cowardice 
or hubris, but from an increasingly widespread perception that 
medical intervention in the process of dying too often results in 
the prolongation oflife to harrowing, undignified and inhumane 
"ixtremes. What, then, are the legal ramifications of physician 
~sisted suicide? 
. Suicide is not a crime in any state.6 Although no court has 
recognized the legality of active physician assisted suicide, no 
reported case exists in which a doctor has been convicted of a 
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crime for any professional activity that facilitated a patient's 
death. Prosecutions for physician assisted suicide are almost as 
uncommon. Since the Karen Quinlan case7 in 1976, the public, 
the medical community, and the courts increasingly have relied 
upon the notion that patient autonomy-the right of each 
patient to accept or refuse treatment-should be extended not 
only to decisions involving ordinary medical care but to those 
involving life and death. Both state and federal courts presently 
recognize patients' right to die whether they are terminally ill, 
whether they are mentally competent, and whether they are 
receiving ordinary or extraordinary care.8 
The Constitutionally protected right to die derives from two 
sources. First, the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the individual from governmental inter-
ference in the arena of personal decision making.9 Second, the 
fundamental right to privacy guaranted by the Fifth and Ninth 
Amendments protects persons from governmental intrusion in 
what traditionally are viewed as domestic affairs such as child-
rearing and education, sexual reproduction and sexual intimacy. 1 ° 
Additionally, the common law provides the doctrine of "in-
formed consent," which accords each individual the right to 
determine what will be done to his or her body. 11 
Dr. Kevorkian violated almost every 
procedural safeguard instituted to 
prevent potential abuses in medical 
practice 
At present, the right to die is limited by the state's interests 
in preserving life, protecting the interests of innocent third 
parties, and maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession.1 2 Generally, courts favor the individual's right to 
control his/her own medical treatment unless an overriding state 
interest is found to exist. Assuming for the moment that no state 
interest overbears the wishes of a patient to die, one must ask 
what difference exists between the physician who actively 
assists her patient in committing suicide by giving him sufficient 
sleeping pills or by providing a lethal injection, and the physician 
who passively assists her patient by disconnecting him from a 
ventilator or allowing him to die "naturally" from withdrawal of 
nutrition and hydration. 
Historically, the law recognizes a difference between active 
euthanasia (murder) and passive euthanasia (letting die by 
natural causes). The distinction between active and passive 
euthanasia is most apparent when a court holds that a patient's 
illness, rather than the withdrawal of the life-sustaining feeding 
tube, ventilator or blood transfusion, "caused" the patient's 
death. This type of causation analysis is based not on a mechani-
cal connection between cause and direct effect, but on a public 
policy of not holding a physician criminally or civilly liable for 
having carried out the wishes of the patient to control the amount 
of pain he/she must endure as well as the manner and timing of 
his/her death. 13 This illusory distinction fails to serve the 
interests of either the patient or the medical community at large. 
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The established principles of patient self-determination, 
patient autonomy and informed consent have coalesced with 
Constitutional guarantees (both federal and state) to ensure that, 
absent an overriding state interest, patients have a right to 
determine how and when they will die. Legislation such as the 
Patient Self-Determination Actreifies this fact. As the California 
judiciary noted in Bouvia, "[w]e do not believe it is the policy of 
this State that all and every life must be preserved against the will 
of the sufferer." 14 The passive/active dichotomy errs in focus-
ing attention upon the process of euthanasia rather than the 
substance of the act, which is one human being giving the means 
for a dignified and merciful death to another who competently 
requests it. 
The conduct of Dr. Kevorkian is troublesome in large part 
because of his dangerously flawed procedures: he violated 
almost every procedural safeguard instituted to prevent poten-
tial abuses in medical practice generally, and in the area of 
euthanasia specifically. 
The contention that legalizing active physician assisted 
suicide will erode the public's trust in doctors is misguided. Dr. 
Kevorkian's frantic efforts to bring the issue to national attention 
must not be allowed to overshadow the mounting public de-
mand for a reassessment of the roles biomedical technology and 
misdirected paternalism play in the process of dying. Indicia of 
that mandate include a sharp increase in the publicity surround-
ing incidents of active physician assisted suicide;15 proposed 
legislation for legalizing active physician assisted suicideJ6 
record sales of Final Exit, 17 a layman's suicide manual by the 
President of the Hemlock Society; and increasing numbers of 
rulings by the judiciary which expand the classes of persons for 
whom euthanasia is a legal alternative to prolonged physical 
suffering and mental anguish. 
It is far more plausible that the refusal of physicians to assist 
patients in the process of dying may heighten public distrust of 
the medical community. As doctors Christine Cassel and Diane 
Meier suggest: 
The public appears to be losing faith in doctors, at 
least partly because of our paternalistic and some-
times cruel insistence on life at any cost. . .. T he 
medical profession in the United States has re-
flected our society's unwillingness to accept death 
as part of life and to face it with some humility. 
Perhaps the public is now ahead of the medical 
profession in this regard, as patients increasingly 
seek the assistance of physicians in their time of 
need, when dying with dignity becomes more 
important than prolonging life. The rigid view that 
physicians should never assist in suicide denies the 
single-minded devotion to its maximal dura-
. 18 non .... 
The time has come to re-evaluate our national healthcare 
priorities regarding the process of dying and to develop, with 
rigor and compassion, alternatives for those who feel forced to 
seek out a Jack Kevorkian for recourse to an undignified and 
inhumane death. T he time has come to answer Alexander 
6 
Solzhenitzyn's question: "T o save one's life at the cost of 
surrendering everything that gives · it color, flavor and 
sparkle ... isn't that an exorbitant price?" 
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values of this approach to the problem? 
In the Netherlands there's a strong sense of independence and 
individualism. This can be seen in our history. The average 
Dutch man or woman wants no one to interfere with his/her 
affairs. In the euthanasia debate we value our freedom of choice 
to take death and dying into our own hands and not leave it to 
physicians or medical technologists. Self-determination is a 
strong Dutch trait. Not so many people are religious any longer, 
so opponents of church paternalism are plentiful. Paternalism by 
physicians ranks about the same, I would guess. Unfortunately, 
they put God and physicians in the same position; both, they 
think, tend to dominate us, to take away our freedom. That's 
why so many want nothing to do with God, physicians, or 
government. And this is one of the strongest incentives behind 
euthanasia. Others argue that it is government's job to protect 
life. The Netherlands do have a "pro-life" movement. But a lot 
of Dutchmen say that the first task of the state is to promote 
individual freedom and people's rights and self-determination. 
Life of itself carries little meaning. It must be life in a framework, 
within a context of sense and meaning-in relation to relatives, 
love, friends, purposes, aims. 
What is the role of the churches and synagogues in these 
discussions? 
There are two Reformed Churches and the Catholic Church. 
The Catholic Church and the bishops oppose euthanasia. In a 
letter to the government they stressed that no one is permitted 
to kill. No physician may kill a sick person upon request. Rather, 
we must see life as a gift of God and suffering as a way of fulfilling 
life's purpose. Euthanasia is a forbidden exit. 
The Reformed Churches are more pastoral in their approach. 
They circulated a letter in all the parishes which resulted in a 
consensus that, before God, euthanasia can be right. They 
argued that the commandments are for people and not people for 
the commandments-a New Testament teaching. They also 
argued-and I agree with them-that God made people free to 
take responsibility for their own lives. We take many responsi-
bilities in matters oflifc;,and death, so why not acknowledge our 
responsibility in matters of death and dying? Euthanasia can 
never become a therapy. It has to remain as the ultimate remedy, 
the last resort, when the patient has no other way out. After 
discussion with family and relatives it is our responsibility before 
8 God and the church. 
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The Dutch people are so secular, they listen to the arguments of 
the church and reply, "That's a good argument, but this is my 
personal position and I stand up for it." 
Synagogues are not as numerous as in the United States. They 
do not play an important role. 
Would your work as a biomedical ethicist be different if you 
were a philosopher without religious commitments rather 
than a Reformed theologian? 
F or me as a theologian, the concepts behind medical ethical 
decisions, talks and discussions are very important. What do you 
mean by "health," for example? Some define health as a total 
state of well-being. I would argue that health also has a spiritual 
complement. Health doesn't mean the freedom from dying or 
the freedom from suffering. Health actually includes pain and 
the negative side oflife. Speaking as a theologian, it's unhealthy 
to try to avoid all risks, suffering, and death itself. The theologi-
cal and the philosophical understanding of the concept of health 
cannot be satisfied by common definitions of health. Theology 
can make an important contribution. 
As a bioethics consultant, do you take a principled ap-
proach, a casuistic approach, or some other approach? 
I favor the casuistic method. Listening to experiences of 
physicians and students of my school in Amsterdam, I try w 
figure out what values are at stake. Let's try to identify thes 
values: what do we mean by these values and how are they 
related to one another? Is there a consistency between them? If 
you say you're against abortion but in favor of nuclear warfare, 
what do you mean by the value of life? I like the Socratic way of 
teaching-to sit together and find out the backgrounds, the 
other side of things. So we try to find out in an inductive way what 
the values are, how the values are related, and if they are 
consistent. Afterward, I can say that these values have been 
identified before. They are found in certain philosophical 
traditions. You can talk about Kant or Aristotle, but I try to start 
from their own experience. Everyone, in a way, is an ethicist and 
has a certain way of reasoning and thinking about values, but 
many do not realize this. The task of an ethicist is to make them 
aware of the values they are actually using. They have their own 
ethical understanding of issues. These hidden beliefs and values 
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